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Abstract
This project explores the way in which the Nazi Party used the Treaty of
Versailles, which laid out the Allies’ terms of defeat for Germany after World War
I, in their propaganda before 1933. The First World War had disastrous effects on
Germany. The volatile conditions of post-war society created many roadblocks to
recovery and left millions feeling alienated and disconnected from the newly
established democratic government. The Treaty of Versailles was incredibly
unpopular and factored into much anti-government propaganda during the
interwar years. In my research I analyzed Nazi publications, speeches, and
member testimony from 1918-1933 and discuss how the Treaty was politicized by
the Party to fit their agenda. I found that the Nazi Party used the Treaty to build
their movement by identifying people or groups who had caused Germany’s
collapse and to justify the purging of those elements. Through the extreme rhetoric
of violence and conflict the Nazi Party also used the animosity toward the Treaty
of Versailles to create their own set of cultural values for Germany to rebuild the
national community and restore Germany as world power.
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The Treaty of Versailles, signed June 28, 1919, was the peace treaty that
laid out the conditions of defeat for Germany after the First World War. In
addition to disarmament, reduced military size, and giving up colonial holdings
and territory gained during the war, the Treaty stated that Germany must accept
full responsibility for starting the conflict and needed to pay reparations to the
Allies for damages.1 Versailles was most vigorously opposed by nationalists,
conservatives, and the political right, who often referred to it as the Diktat, the
dictated peace, because it was only accepted under threat of continued hostility by
the Allies.2 The National Assembly debate of June 22, 1919 regarding whether or
not to accept the Treaty of Versailles focused not on if terms were fair and just but
on if Germany had the capability to continue the war with a ruined economy and
no remaining allies.3 Reception of Versailles was not aided by the fact that it was
nearly universally rejected by the parties in parliament who voted on it and was
incredibly unpopular with the German people.4 This near-universal hatred for the
Treaty of Versailles created a strong foundation for the Nazi Party to use it in their
propaganda to create and identify enemies of the German state. Demonizing
Versailles allowed the Nazi Party to exploit and manipulate the emotions of the
German people during the tumultuous first years of the German Republic and
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project it onto people or groups implicated in the breakdown of German society
following the end of the war.
The Treaty of Versailles further destabilized politics and made it more
difficult for Germany to establish itself as a democracy after the war. Germany
made the switch from constitutional monarchy to parliamentary democracy after
Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicated in November 1918, passing power to the largest
parliamentary party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD). A new constitution was
drafted and signed in August 1919 in the city of Weimar, cementing Germany as a
democracy and giving the German Republic the nickname Weimar Germany. To
its most ardent opponents, the Treaty of Versailles was a national humiliation and
evidence that Germany’s enemies were subjecting the country to “economic
enslavement” via enforcing reparations payments.5 For a country that so long
prided itself on its military strength defeat was unthinkable, and the changes
German society was undergoing were unacceptable. Conspiracy theories about
internal sabotage of the military and government abounded. This “stab in back”,
perpetrated by the “November Criminals” (referencing the Armistice of November
1918), embodied conservative and nationalist discontent with and rejection of
democracy in Germany. To them, the Treaty of Versailles marked the foreign
takeover of Germany and its downfall as a world power.
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The National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP), most commonly
known as the Nazi Party, was founded in February of 1920 and based much of
their ideology on opposing the changes German society underwent as a result of
the Treaty of Versailles. A main goal of the Nazi Party was to restore Germany to
world power status through abolishing the Treaty. The Nazi Party cited Versailles
as the root of all the crises that struck Germany. The success of Nazism depended
on conflict and crisis, making the Treaty of Versailles necessary to the Party. They
would argue that all the economic, political, and social crises facing Germany in
the Weimar period were its direct consequences. As long as the Treaty was in
effect, enemies of Germany could always be identified or created, giving the Party
purpose. Socialists, the political left, Jews, Communists, the Allies, the November
Criminals; Nazi propaganda tied them all to Versailles and portrayed them all as
threats to Germany that needed to be purged.
This project explores how the Nazi Party used the Treaty of Versailles in
their propaganda from the end of the First World War in 1918 until Hitler’s
appointment as Chancellor in March of 1933, though focuses primarily on the
period of 1919 to 1923. It was during these early years of social, economic, and
political crisis that the Nazi Party was formed and shaped their ideology. The
purpose of this work is not to establish Versailles as important to Nazism (as that
is hardly debated) nor is it trying to paint the Treaty as the cause of Third Reich.
Rather, it is to provide an analysis of the specific way that the Treaty was used in
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Nazi propaganda. This project also analyzes why Nazi propaganda about sabotage
and betrayal resonated with certain groups of individuals, such as conservatives,
nationalists, and veterans, and the circumstances that made them susceptible to the
violent rhetoric of National Socialism.
The emergence of Nazism as a major political force in Weimar Germany
has been extensively studied by scholars since the beginning of the Third Reich in
1933. Even during the Weimar period scholars were searching to explain how a
movement like National Socialism formed and rose to prominence in German
politics. In the 1930s, German historian Fritz Morstein Marx and American
sociologist Theodore Abel both attributed the rise of Nazism to inflamed
nationalism. For Marx, it was how the Allies treated Germany as a defeated nation
through the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles, particularly the demilitarization
clauses, that radicalized sectors of the population.6 Abel, in his 1938 book Why
Hitler Came Into Power, wrote that Hitler was not “building his movement upon a
void”, but was rather using and exploiting the existing fear, opposition, and
discontent in Germany that resulted from the loss of the war and the imposition of
the Treaty of Versailles.7
The Sonderweg, or “special path”, thesis became popular for explaining
Nazism in the World War II and post-war eras. Sonderweg posited that the Third

6
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Reich was the logical conclusion to all German history, implying that democracy
was destined to fail in Germany. Scholars asserted that the weaknesses of the
Weimar system were in part because of the authoritarian nature of German
political culture. This complicated Germany’s path of modernization in the
nineteenth century and made democratization impossible. This view is flawed,
however, because it is based on the idea of there being a correct way for a country
to modernize, ignoring Germany’s unique sociocultural circumstances or applying
them incorrectly.8 The trend of looking to Germany’s political past to try to
explain how a movement like National Socialism could come to be was also
popular in this era. Rohan Butler in The Roots of National Socialism (1942) and
Ralph Flenley in Modern German History (1953) start their analysis of German
society and politics centuries before German unification in 1871. Butler provides
an in depth analysis on the quality of German national thought starting in the
eighteenth century, and comes to the conclusion that Germany’s authoritarian
political history meant that a democratic state was destined to fail.9 Flenley takes a
more middle ground position by saying that while the Third Reich itself was not
the singular outcome of the collapse of the Weimar Republic a political structure
akin to Hitler’s dictatorship was its most likely successor because of the
prevalence of authoritarian thought in German political culture.10 But, as historian
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Geoff Eley later points out in Unification to Nazism (1986), this approach risks
taking what eighteenth and nineteenth century German philosophers, politicians,
and historians thought about government and the role of the state out of their
appropriate context and twisting them to fit a specific narrative, as well as oversimplifying the study of Nazism by attributing it to merely the persistence of old
political traditions.11
More recent scholarship has moved away from the idea that the Third Reich
was inevitable. In the 1980s and into the 1990s authors such as Eberhard Kolb,
Detlev Peukert, and Eley argued that the Weimar Republic needed to be studied as
more than just a precursor to the Third Reich. Eley wrote that the Third Reich is
too often considered the “terminal point” that every political development in
Germany from unification to the Weimar era led to.12 Germany’s attempts to fulfil
the terms of the Treaty of Versailles are almost always referred to as having only
negative outcomes. Peukert refuted this idea in his book The Weimar Republic
when he argued that the Treaty of Versailles had the potential to actually enhance
Germany’s position in Europe through cooperation and accommodation with other
nations, strengthening it in the long term, but it was the psychological barrier of
losing the war that prevented the German government from effectively utilizing its
new position.13 Peukert established that there existed a disconnect between the
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perception of the effects of the Treaty of Versailles and its real effects. Kolb is of
the same vein when he said the “highly unpropitious circumstances” of the
Republic’s birth did not doom its long-term viability.14
The primary sources analyzed in this project consist mainly of publications
from the Nazi Party, including leadership and regular members. Speeches and
accounts from Adolf Hitler and Party propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels
indicate how current events were being explained as products of the Treaty of
Versailles. They also present Nazism as the sole solution to these issues. Within
these documents it is important to look for who or what is being identified as a
problem for Germany and why they are being portrayed that way. Accounts and
memoirs from people who joined the Nazi Party between 1920 and 1933 are also
used to provide insight for how messages from the Party resonated with people
and persuaded them to join. Accounts from other important political actors provide
greater context for how Versailles was seen in the conservative-nationalist camp,
as well as give a sense of the general political atmosphere of post-war Germany.
Other documents, like the Treaty of Versailles itself and the National Assembly
Debate of June 1919 are also of great importance as they set the groundwork for
the political, economic, and social developments of the entire Weimar era.
This research project begins with an overview of German politics and
political culture prior to the First World War to gain an understanding of how
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Germany viewed itself as a nation and how that conception was threatened by the
defeat and the Treaty of Versailles. This is followed by a discussion of the genesis
of the Nazi Party, the circumstances it was born into, and the way that Versailles
and the Weimar Republic factored into its propaganda. From there is a discussion
about German cultural identity and how it was redefined by the crises of the
Weimar era and the affect this had on German politics leading up to the 1932
elections when the Nazis gained control of the government.
The Treaty of Versailles was hated amongst nationalist circles because it
signified German society coming under foreign influence. The signing of the
Treaty marked a fundamental shift in German politics because of its international
origins. Rejection of the foreign in favor of a purely German culture was central to
how Germany viewed itself as a people, or a Volk, and a political entity. The
conceptualization of Germany as a Volk has roots in the Enlightenment, when
German intellectuals and historians were taking ideas about reason, freedom, and
empiricism to redefine notions of government and the nation state. Eighteenth
century historian Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) popularized the view of
German peoples being part of an organic whole, tied together by culture and
language.15 It was also during this period that the Volk took on racial and ethnic
connotations, as a Volk was strongest when it was pure.

15
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Volk thought greatly informed German politics, starting in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries. Influential philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (17621814) believed that the primary goal of the governing body of a nation was to
create an environment that best supported the advancement and well-being of its
people.16 For Germany this meant achieving autarky and practicing a purely
German culture.17 Philosopher Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854)
built on this idea when he envisioned the state as the embodiment of the culture of
the people comprising it.18 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831) believed,
similar to Schelling, that the state was the spirit of the Volk.19 It was therefore
above judgement by any recognized standard of morality.20 Nazi ideology was
influenced by Hegel in that the Nazis did not believe in universal ethics. Every
national community evolved its own set of moral standards and could not be
judged based on another’s.21 Part of the reason the Treaty of Versailles was
rejected was because it was a set of rules another country made for Germany to
follow.
The idea of creating and preserving a pure German culture also helped
militarize conceptions of the Volk in the nineteenth century. In 1813, French
forces under Napoleon invaded Germany. It became critical for Germany’s
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survival to have a strong military to repel attacks and prevent being absorbed into
another culture’s body politic. Unity of ideology was also stressed as important for
military strength; the people needed to truly believe in what they were fighting for.
Aggression towards the foreign was prominent in Volk thought, though not
universal.22 Another aspect of Volk militarism was the acquisition of resources to
ensure Germany’s survival for generations to come. Political theorist Adam
Heinrich Müller (1779-1829) was one of the earliest thinkers to assert that war
was necessary for the natural growth of the nation and should thus be met with
enthusiasm.23 Later historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896) took Müller’s
ideas to an extreme when he said, “war must be conceived as an institution
ordained by God.”24 It was Germany’s divine purpose as a Volk to expand across
the world using war as the instrument to do so. In this way the Volk transformed
from a political philosophy into a cultural mindset.
Unity of ideology became even more important to German leadership after
unification in 1871 and the establishment of the German Empire. Germany as a
Volk was used in state propaganda to inspire the people of the different German
states to see themselves as part of a single entity. It also stressed loyalty to the
state and conformity to a set of values outlined in official propaganda. There was
no place for division and difference if the new German Empire were to succeed.
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Geoff Eley called this approach “unification from above.”25 This drive for unity
greatly discouraged party politics. Opponents of parliamentarianism said that party
politics only encouraged division and distracted people from working towards a
common good.26 Party politics were unnecessary for, or even actively damaging
to, the strength and advancement of the nation.
The political structure of the German Empire was a constitutional
monarchy, but democratic practice was weak. Otto von Bismarck (1815-1898), the
German statesman who masterminded German unification, was appointed
Chancellor by the emperor and headed the federal government until 1890.
Bismarck’s government was strongly centralized around his office as Chancellor.
He viewed the party system of the Reichstag (the German parliament) as a marker
of public opinion, but not something he considered himself nor the government
obligated to follow.27 He viewed political parties as irresponsible, calling them the
“ruin of our constitution and our future.”28 It is easy to see how Volk political
tradition dominated this era. Even the progressive camp was not free from its
influence. Many liberals in the Bismarckian era accepted the centralized
monarchical-military control because they believed it would bring unity, however,
this inhibited the ability of the progressive movement to make significant gains
over conservatism.29 Volk political thought held that the few would act for the
25

Eley, From Unification to Nazism, 72.
Marx, Government in the Third Reich, 33.
27
Marx, Government in the Third Reich, 28.
28
Quoted in Flenley, Modern German History, 289.
29
Flenley, Modern German History, 280.
26

15

good of the many as long as the many trusted and remained loyal to the few. In
this context, parliamentarism only bred unnecessary division and questioned the
validity of the entire German political system.
Volk ideology created unique interpretations of how democracy should
operate in Germany. In The Roots of National Socialism, Rohan Butler uses the
example of Weimar foreign minister Walther Rathenau to illustrate how Volk
ideology colored the perception of the viability of republicanism in Germany.30
During the First World War Rathenau oversaw Germany’s economy and was a
minister of reconstruction after the defeat. He was part of the left-leaning German
Democratic Party (DDP), a party that supported democracy and liberal reform but
had not voted yes on accepting the Treaty of Versailles.31 In what seems rather
paradoxical, Rathenau felt that a hybrid of democracy and autocracy was the best
fit for German government; a ruling elite would represent the interests of society,
but ultimately all power would be held by one individual.32 Rathenau’s views of
democracy were not universal in the leftist camp but they do demonstrate how
German political thinkers were changing democracy to fit German culture rather
than changing German culture to fit democracy, and how there was still a place for
authoritarianism in liberal thinking.

30
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The monocratic structure of German government did not disappear with the
monarchy after 1918. The office of President held disproportionate power.
Presidents could appoint chancellors, ministers, army commanders, and civil
servants without Reichstag approval.33 Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution
stipulated that if public safety and order were threatened the Reichstag President
could enact martial law and “temporarily abrogate, wholly or in part, the
fundamental principles laid down in Articles 114, 115, 117, 118, 123, 124, and
153.”34 The referenced articles pertained to civil liberties, such as the right to free
speech and expression of opinion (118) and the ability to peacefully assemble
(123).35 The arbitrary power afforded to the President reveal that the writers of the
constitution were either hesitant or reluctant to establish a truly parliamentary
system.
The existence and persistence of these authoritarian structures complicated
Germany’s ability to become a democracy after the end of World War I. German
politics emphasized top-down control. Creating a true democracy meant
completely reversing prior thought and practice. During the war the military had
controlled the country, with generals Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff
as de facto dictators. The transition from a monarchy to a republic was very abrupt
and was done more to secure potentially lenient terms of defeat from the Allies
33
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than to a commitment to democratizing German politics. The lack of transparency
with the German public about the country’s performance in the war also ensured
that much of the population was unprepared for the changes in politics that were to
come.
When it became clear that they were losing the war in the fall of 1918
German leadership began devising ways to mitigate the costs of defeat. They
placed their hopes on appealing to the United States for securing more favorable
peace terms. In January of 1918 President Woodrow Wilson gave his Fourteen
Points speech outlining his vision for ending the war and preventing similar
conflict in the future. Because Wilson detested the authoritarianism and militarism
of the German Empire, Hindenburg and Ludendorff believed that America would
be more likely to intervene on Germany’s behalf during peace negotiations if
Germany adopted a more democratic system of government.36 In October of 1918
Kaiser Wilhelm II agreed to introduce democratic reform to German politics. The
Reichstag Chancellor was made responsible only to parliament instead of the
emperor, and at Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s insistence the civilian parties of the
Reichstag conducted negotiations with the Allies in place of the imperial
apparatus.37
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As peace negotiations went on, pressure mounted from both progressive
and conservative camps for the government to make even more radical political
changes to placate the Allies. Working class, middle class, and petty bourgeoisie
alike were calling for more radical constitutional reforms.38 Among the demands
for political change was Wilhelm’s abdication. It was believed that abdication was
the only possible option for securing American support after President Wilson
declared that the United States demanded German surrender if it were to enter
peace talks with an authoritarian monarchy.39 In October of 1918, Secretary of
State Robert Lansing said that “The Government of the United States cannot deal
with any but veritable representatives of the German people who have been
assured of a genuine constitutional standing as the real rulers of Germany.”40
Wilhelm’s advisors convinced him to step down as emperor on November 9, 1918
and Germany signed the Armistice of November 11 as a parliamentary democracy.
Peace negotiations between the Allies and Germany after 1918 were long
and messy, ending with the bitter reality of the Treaty of Versailles. With its
economy and army in ruins, Germany did not have the leverage to tilt negotiations
in its favor by way of threats.41 In the words of Kolb, “the disputes and conflicts at
the peace conference took place not between the Allies and their defeated enemies

38
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but within the Allied camp itself.”42 The Germans were also incensed that the
terms of defeat were not being drafted based on President Wilson’s Fourteen
Points. But Germany had misconstrued Wilson’s call for their surrender the
previous October. Wilson’s demand to only negotiate with “veritable
representatives of the German people” did not necessitate the abolition of the
monarchy, only that parliament be given more power. Constitutional reform was
already being advocated for before November. The German imperial government
had taken matters to the extreme when they did not have to.
The new government of Germany, headed by the Social Democrats, earned
itself the name the November Criminals with the signing of the Armistice. The
expectation among Germans was that the abolition of the monarchy would be
enough for the Allies to give Germany more lenient conditions of defeat. The
drive for abolishing the monarchy had been led by the liberal camp and the Social
Democratic Party. For the SPD to advocate for such radical changes to the
government – changes that worked in their favor – without getting the promised
pay off was seen as nothing short of treason to their political opposition. The
SPD’s reputation was not aided by the fact that on the night of November 8, 1918,
they had offered the monarchy an ultimatum: either the Kaiser abdicates, and SPD
influence is strengthened, or the party withdraws from the government.43 The SPD
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was the largest political party in Germany at this time. Their withdrawal from
politics would have had dire consequences for political and social stability. In
subsequent years, the November Criminals were vilified by the Nazi Party for
acting in their own interests rather than for the good of the country. Not only had
they sabotaged the war effort, but they violated Volk principles of the state being
the guardian of the people. Bismarck’s belief of party politics ruining the country
seemed to hold true. Many conservatives and nationalists vehemently opposed
democracy because of its close association with losing the war, delegitimizing the
Weimar Republic before it even truly began.
The Social Democratic Party was unequipped to handle real authority when
they were passed power in 1918. Part of this is because of Germany’s authoritarian
political traditions. As discussed above, the Reichstag had very little real power
prior to 1914 because of how the imperial government viewed parliamentarism.
Furthermore, the SPD failed to take advantage of their newfound power to make
the revolutionary changes they promised. Even before the First World War their
commitment to revolutionary values was debated. In 1900, Minister of Foreign
Affairs and Imperial Chancellor Bernhard von Bülow described the Social
Democratic Party as being a “reforming party” rather than a revolutionary one.44
Their desire for majority support made them take a gradual implementation
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approach rather than enacting sweeping change all at once.45 In his book The Nazi
Seizure of Power, historian William Sheridan Allen said the SPD “was unwilling
to be a revolutionary party at a time when the best defense of democracy may have
been social revolution.”46 The SPD chose to work within the existing power
framework rather than create a new one that was more conducive for what they
wanted to achieve. In some ways this is understandable because they were keen to
avoid alienating more of the population. Unity was a priority, prompting the SPD
to make the hard choice of compromising its revolutionary goals to garner support
from the center and the right. Unfortunately, it was precisely this unwillingness to
take a hard stance and risk alienating voters that gained the socialist government
the reputation of being weak, ineffective, and harmful to the wellbeing of the
nation.
The failure of the Social Democrats to unite German politics and their
inability to alleviate the effects of social and economic crisis created fertile a
breeding ground for radical fringe groups to form and grow. The Nazi Party was
merely one such group. The atmosphere of high unemployment, food scarcity, and
attacks on cultural identity between 1919 and 1923 politicized the population and
drove many into forming or joining radical antidemocratic groups. It was during
this time that a young Adolf Hitler joined what would become the Nazi Party. But
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the plethora of radical right-wing parties that emerged in this period were hardly
united. They were disorganized and often contradicted each other in their
ideology, inhibiting them from forming a strong front of opposition to the socialist
government.47 This also kept them from threatening the political power of already
established right-wing parties, such as the German National People’s Party
(DNVP), the major conservative-nationalist party in Weimar. It was not until the
Nazi Party (and even then not until the late 1920s) that the radical right fringe
consolidated and took over the traditional conservative-nationalist position.
The Nazi reaction to the Treaty of Versailles was informed by the Volk
ideology of rejecting and purging foreign elements that weakened Germany as a
people and a nation. The Nazi Party was originally founded as the German
Worker’s Party (DAP) on January 5, 1919. That same day, party founder Anton
Drexler published a set of guidelines for the DAP in the newspaper Auf gut
Deutsch (In Good German), an antisemitic weekly run by party cofounder Dietrich
Eckart. One guideline reads, “We want to be governed only by Germans;
foreigners and Jews govern us only in their own interest or in the interest of a
foreign country.”48 Nationalists and conservatives hated the Treaty of Versailles
before its terms were even finalized because of what it represented: Germany
being conquered by a stronger entity. In Volk philosophy this almost certainly
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meant death as a weak Volk was easily conquered, and a Volk that had been
conquered meant it had been weak. It also revealed the anxiety over the extent of
foreign influence that the DAP and the larger radical nationalist faction expected
peace negotiations would bring. The un-Germanness of the parliamentary system
and hatred of internationalism featured heavily in later Nazi anti-Weimar
propaganda.
The Party Program of 1920 is very telling of Nazi attitudes towards the
changes the Treaty of Versailles brought to Germany. The program was presented
at the Party’s first public meeting on February 24, 1920. Adolf Hitler drafted the
program alongside Gottfried Feder and Anton Drexler. Its twenty-five points
establish the basis of Nazi ideology and their goals and demands. The Treaty of
Versailles is referred to explicitly very early on; the second point reads, “we
demand equality of rights for the German people in its dealings with other nations,
and the abolishment of the Peace Treaties of Versailles.”49 The first point calls for
the unification of all Germans into a Greater Germany on “the basis of the right of
self-determination.”50 The Nazi Party immediately established itself as standing in
direct opposition to Versailles. They portrayed it as the instrument the Allies were
using to impose their own will on Germany and to deny them the dignity and
respect afforded to other nations.
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The stab-in-the-back legend circulated by right-wing nationalists also
contributed to the rejection of the Treaty of Versailles. Official propaganda about
the success of the German war effort had done its job as most on the home front
were unaware Germany was even struggling until the Armistice was announced.51
It was unthinkable that Germany’s strong military could have suffered so complete
a defeat as in 1918. Prominent military men and politicians advanced the idea that
internal sabotage made Germany lose. General Hindenburg, in his testimony
before the Constitutional Assembly in November 1919, said that Germany’s defeat
was the result of “secret intentional mutilation of the fleet and the army” by
revolutionary forces.52 Revolutionary forces meaning the political left. For those
who believed it, the political left and any entities associated with it (most often the
Jews) came to represent the downfall of Germany and the continued negative
impact of foreign institutions. The stab-in-the-back legend was a crucial element
in Nazi militarism because it justified aggression against those who would see
Germany fail.53 By identifying them as enemies, violence against perpetrators of
Weimar was encouraged as necessary.
Hindenburg and Ludendorff’s propagation of the stab-in-the-back myth
gave it legitimacy. Hindenburg was a well-known political figure and a war hero
and Ludendorff had been leader of the Supreme Army Command. That two
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military leaders such as these would believe that Germany had been sabotaged
must be true. Yet it was these two generals who had masterminded the German
surrender in 1918. The SPD and the political left were only criminals and traitors
because military leadership had failed to win the war. Hindenburg and
Ludendorff’s success in passing control of the country to the Reichstag parties
absolved the old leadership of facing the consequences of its own failed policy.54
In this way the reputation of the political right was not seriously damaged by the
events of 1918 and 1919.55 The left had a harder time gaining new supporters from
the conservatives and nationalists because of this. The stab-in-the-back also made
out the new political right, represented by groups like the Nazis, as a valid
alternative to current politics because these groups advocated for and engaged in
violence against the government in order to right the injustices the November
Criminals had committed against the German military and the German people.
Reparations payments were one such injustice forced upon Germany and
were an especially contentious part of the Treaty of Versailles. In his address to
the National Assembly in February of 1919, while peace negotiations were still
ongoing, German President and SPD leader Friedrich Ebert strongly objected to
reparations and encouraged the Assembly to contest them. Like many of his peers,
he considered the demand for reparations to be nothing more than the Allies trying
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to exact revenge on Germany by resigning them to debt slavery; “the German
people cannot for 20, 40, or 60 years be made the wage slave of other nations.”56
The effect of reparations on Germany’s economy and its consequences for the
good of the people factored prominently in Nazi propaganda in the 1920s. In one
of his speeches, prominent Nazi orator, speech writer, and future propaganda
minister Joseph Goebbels said that the Allies had essentially reduced Germany to
the status of colony, being used only to “fill money sacks with interest
payments.”57 The Volk fear of being conquered by another, stronger nation had
apparently been realized and it was the current leaders of the country who had
enabled it to happen. The could be no more clearer evidence than this that
allowing the democratic government to continue running the country would only
result in more ruin.
At the National Assembly debate of June 22, 1919, the only parties that
voted to accept the Treaty were the Social Democrats, the Independent Social
Democrats (USDP),58 and the Catholic Center Party.59 But the reasons for the SPD
and Center yes vote were not because they believed Versailles to be a fair
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agreement. Rather, they believed that the Treaty was a means of preventing future
destruction. The SPD believed that voting no to a peace agreement only delayed a
yes vote because Germany did not have the means to resist at that time.60 There
were still clauses that these parties opposed, such as accepting full blame for the
war and paying reparations. But admitting the Treaty of Versailles “exceed[ed] the
limits of Germany’s ability to comply”61 and still voting yes hardly endeared the
SPD to non-supporters and did little to dispel the myth of the party’s betrayal.
Using the stab-in-the-back legend, the Nazi Party placed the Weimar
Republic and its democratic values in direct opposition to true German values. In
the early days of the Party Hitler often cited the Social Democrats and their allies,
sometimes even the entire parliamentary system, as responsible for the breakdown
of German political life. In a speech given in Munich in December 1922, Hitler
contrasts the failings of the current system with the strength of the old Empire.
The SPD were swindlers, liars, “the dumbest people and those most useless to
their professions” who acted in the interest of the Allies instead of the German
nation, and whose successes were “attributable only to a propaganda of lies.”62
Hitler presented the National Socialists as being the only dependable party
because they espoused the same values of greatness and victory that the old
Empire did.63 In contrast, the November Criminals had betrayed the country and
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drove it to ruin to advance their own agenda. A key element of anti-Versailles
Nazi political propaganda was that Nazism was the only solution to the issues
created by Versailles.
The clauses of the Treaty regarding Germany’s military help explain why
veterans made up a large portion of Nazi support. The Allies had enforced German
disarmament without disarming themselves, putting Germany in a position where
it was surrounded by armed enemies with no military power of its own.64 At the
signing of the Armistice the German military numbered six million.65 Versailles
reduced this to only one hundred thousand and set strict limits on the size of the
navy and completely abolished the air force.66 By severely reducing the size of the
military the Allies had directly attacked a cornerstone of German nationalism. The
military as an institution was the nation’s first line of defense against hostile
outsiders. Removing this left the country unprotected and vulnerable to further
assault.
The loss of World War I and the imposition of the Treaty of Versailles was
a great humiliation to Germany, and ex-soldiers felt this very keenly. In more
ways than one many veterans found returning to civilian life difficult. “The march
home was the bitterest experience I have ever had,” writes one ex-soldier, “I was a
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broken man, on the point of losing himself…”67 The chance of a military career
for veterans was reduced to almost nothing given the restrictions outlined in the
Treaty. Jobs were scarce due to the damage the war wrought on the economy.
Many veterans felt that the promises of liberty, peace, and democracy made by the
socialist government did not apply to them.68 They were left confused and
disoriented in a new, alien society. One soldier wrote, “we could not be reconciled
to the apparent fact that all our struggles and sacrifices had been in vain.”69 The
slow return of German prisoners of war did not aid in the demilitarization of a
significant portion of men. In 1919 there were still over eight hundred thousand
German prisoners of war being held by Allied forces, and many would not be
home until mid-1920.70 Available jobs were taken by that point, leaving many
unemployed, desperate, and resentful. Many men joined the Nazi Stormtroopers
(Sturmabteilung, SA) for the simple reason that it fed and clothed its members in
times when work was scarce or irregular.71 In this way the NSDAP succeeded
where the government did not in providing for the German people, and the Party
used this to its advantage to discredit the so-called socialist values of the Weimar
government.
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As a proxy for the real military, many former military men joined
paramilitary organizations like the Freikorps. The private units, or citizen militias,
that made up the Freikorps were often hired by national-conservative political
groups to put down left-wing movements or uprisings, sometimes working
alongside what was left of the formal German military, the Reichswehr.72 The
drive of the Freikorps was to protect Germany from internal and external threats.73
The Freikorps was decidedly antidemocratic, anticommunist, and was willing to
act outside the law. At their peak in 1919 the organization had over two hundred
thousand members, most of them veterans.74 Robert Herzstein wrote that the
Freikorps “was an outlet for frustrated militaristic and patriotic sentiments.”75 One
young man who joined the Freikorps soon after the war detailed the feeling of
hopelessness and betrayal he felt watching crowds cheering for the soldiers
returning from the front, “Could the casualties of war have been for nothing? That
could not be the case; that was impossible.”76 For the true patriot, defeat was an
unacceptable reality. As for why he joined the Freikorps he said, “what we wanted
we did not know, and what we knew we did not want. War, adventure, excitement,
and destruction; an indefinable, tormenting force…”77 Joining militaristic
organizations gave these men order and purpose when they felt there was none.
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Many who joined the Nazi SA after its founding in 1921 were former Freikorps
members.
Between 1921 and 1922 the Freikorps were behind a series of
assassinations of Republican leaders, which were applauded by Germany’s
political right.78 Their victims included Matthias Erzberger, the Center politician
who had signed the Armistice, and Walther Rathenau, the Republic’s Foreign
Minister and the man who had been in charge of organizing Germany’s economy
during World War I. Erzberger and Rathenau were among the November
Criminals, so their deaths were justified as the elimination of an enemy of
Germany. Eliminating those implicated in Germany’s downfall during World War
I was the necessary first step to restoring Germany as world power.
Hitler’s status as veteran gave him considerable influence with the unsettled
ex-military population. He had served in the German army from 1914 to 1919 and
understood the bitter feelings of the soldiers well. One veteran-turned-Nazi said of
Hitler; “You are our man. You speak as a soldier of the front and as a man…you
have given your whole being…for the wellbeing of Germany.”79 His antiVersailles militarism drew in those who felt the terms of the Versailles Treaty
were driven by the Allies’ fears of a strong Germany. To the disaffected patriot,
Hitler represented the true German man, the strong soldier willing to sacrifice
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everything for his nation. He also offered strong leadership and inspired hope and
confidence in Germany’s future, two qualities that many felt Weimar was
seriously lacking.80 The Nazi Party was also supported by what was left of the
Reichswehr. The German army was well known to assist radical right-wing groups
to subvert the conditions of the Treaty of Versailles regarding military activity.81
Much of the funding in the NSDAP’s early days came from the Reichswehr.82 In
fact, it was Reichswehr officials who ordered Hitler to attend a DAP meeting in
September of 1919.83 The official military gave these groups legitimacy through
its patronage, helping to swell their numbers. Through contact with the Nazi Party,
many young veterans were introduced to politics “in the familiar terms of
discipline and fighting.”84 The Weimar Republic was subsequently turned into the
antithesis to everything these men held to be true about their people and country.
There was no shortage of anger over the clauses of the Treaty of Versailles
for the Nazi Party to exploit. Along with reparations, the infamous war guilt clause
caused an uproar. Article 231 required that “Germany accepts the responsibility of
Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied
and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjects.”85 Germany
felt itself surrounded by enemies who hated it and wished to see it fall. “We know
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the intensity of the hatred which meets us,” said Foreign Minister Ulrich von
Brockdorf-Rantzau at the Versailles Peace Conference in Paris in May of 1919.86
Placing full blame for the destruction on Germany was both egregiously unfair and
well beyond the nation’s economic capability to cover. Theologian Ernst Troeltsch
called Versailles “an imperialist monstrosity made possibly by the deceit of the
Fourteen Points,”87 putting into words the popular sentiment that the War Guilt
clause and the Treaty of Versailles as a whole were less about peace and
reconciliation between equals and more the Allies trying to annihilate a threat to
enhance their own power.
The Nazi Party used the Treaty of Versailles to create friend-foe
dichotomies. Everything was presented as opposites: National Socialism or
Marxism, German or Jew, national or foreign, strength or weakness, survival or
annihilation. In Nazi thought, as it was in Volk thought, internationalism was the
breakdown of German strength. Germany’s restoration could only come about if
Germans focused on helping other Germans. By using fears of social breakdown,
the Nazi Party appealed more to emotion than to reason. Hitler believed that
appealing to emotion was the best way to build a movement because it inspired
stronger belief. In his autobiography Mein Kampf he wrote, “The broad masses of
a population are more amenable to the appeal of rhetoric than to any other force.
86
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All great movements are popular movements. They are the volcanic eruptions of
human passions and emotions…”88 Weimar Germany had nothing if not eruptions
of emotions. There existed in Weimar Germany an existential fear for the
country’s future. It was not difficult for the Nazis to convince people of impending
doom and get them to support radical action when they may not have otherwise.
In October 1925, Joseph Goebbels published a tract regarding the state of
Weimar politics and the future of Germany titled “National Socialism or
Bolshevism?” This piece argues that the international qualities of Weimar
socialism are ineffective in providing for the needs of the German people.89
Internationalism was detrimental to the health of the German Volk because it is
not the German way. Goebbels conceded that Socialist Democrats and National
Socialists have the same goals for the country – freedom and stability – but argued
that only National Socialism could achieve them. He writes, “we want freedom, as
you do, but with other means, with means that lead with to the goal…The
community of the people today is nothing but the struggle for the rights of the
people for the sake of the nation.”90 The means and methods of National Socialism
are rooted in Volk cultural values, making them the best path forward for
Germany. One such method of attaining freedom for Germany was to protest the
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German government that had decided not to fight the forces that subjugated the
country. Goebbels asserted that going the route of peaceful discussion with the
Allies made a mockery of the suffering the German people experienced after the
end of the war. “To talk of calm today is to make the cemetery one’s home; to be
peaceful under this government is to be pacifist and cowardly.”91 Associating
peace and pacifism with cowardice is very telling of how Nazism viewed foreign
relations. Germany was meant to be a strong nation, a world power, and it could
not be that via peaceful cooperation. This could only be attained through struggle
against foreign entities and institutions. Goebbels called for unity between
Germans to overthrow the democratic government in favor of a National Socialist
one to ensure the survival of the nation.
Another success of the Nazi Party was that it set itself apart from the
Weimar political system. National Socialism was much more than a political party
with an agenda, it was a movement “that encompassed everything Germans held
to be true and just.”92 Theodore Abel’s 1938 study Why Hitler Came Into Power
provides insight into why so many people converted to Nazism during the 1920s.
In 1934, as a sociology professor at Columbia University, Abel convinced the
Nazi state to let him hold an essay contest for Party members who had joined
before 1933 by saying that the rest of the world needed to learn more about
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National Socialism. In one essay, a bank clerk who joined the Party sometime
before 1927 said that the belief in National Socialism was not something learned,
but something that sprang up from instinct.93 Nazism was successful because it put
into words the feelings many already held about the state of Germany and its
future. The Treaty of Versailles uprooted deeply entrenched social values and
produced an emotional reaction from the people.94 This emotion manifested in the
extreme nationalism the Nazis were known for.
The rallying point of National Socialism was the Volksgemeinschaft, or the
national community. In 1925 Hitler cited the real reason for Germany’s collapse in
World War I as being the millions of Germans who “no longer believe[d] in their
ethnicity.”95 A common idea spread among nationalists following 1918 was that
unity had not been strong enough during the war.96 This is how the stab-in-theback was able to happen: the Socialist-Jewish construct of class lines had
encouraged internal divisions, causing Germans to turn against Germans instead of
fighting their external enemies. To unify once again and restore the German nation
to its former strength, the Nazis stressed conformity to a set of values based in the
Volk. One such value was racial purity. In Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s
Community, 1918-1945, historian Thomas Kühne analyzes how advocating for
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mass murder was used by the Nazi Party as a unifying force. He wrote that
genocidal war against the Jews and other “undesirables” was more than just a
purge of potential danger, it was a way for the German people to bond as part of
the Volkgemeinschaft, “delud[ing] themselves into believing that they would attain
a homogenous and harmonious social body, cleansed of pollution, conflict, and
inner enemies.”97 The unification of Germany the National Socialists desired went
far beyond just politics. They believe that a pure German populace would no doubt
support Nazism because the Party represented pure German ideals. The political
divisions and social upheaval that Germany experienced after 1918 were therefore
not just the result of differences of opinion between groups or individuals, they
were differences of biology and culture. This absolutist view encouraged violence
against “others” because those deemed dangerous could not be changed, they had
to be eradicated for the threat they posed to be neutralized.
Jews were an important group in Nazi propaganda against the Treaty of
Versailles and the Weimar government. Jews were lumped in with the November
Criminals, Socialists, Communists, or any group that was associated with the
Weimar system and blamed for the outcome of the war. Like the others, the Jews
were accused of working against the common good by allying with international
forces to further their own agenda. The purported rootlessness of German Jews –
that they had moved onto the land instead of organically evolving there – meant
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that they had no spiritual connection to and love for the land or its true people, and
therefore had more potential to cause harm.98 In a 1922 speech Hitler charged that
the Communist and Social Democratic movements were Jewish creations made
with the intent of destroying German culture.99 Goebbels once wrote in no
uncertain terms that “the Jew caused our misery and lives from it today.”100
Appealing to fear was the Nazi’s specialty, and they used this tactic to make
Germany’s Jews into perhaps the greatest enemy facing the nation.
Nazi accusations of the Jews of committing treason through sabotaging the
war effort and working with the Allies to impose the Treaty of Versailles on
Germany did not create the rabid antisemitism Hitler’s party was known for,
though it certainly had a hand in its radicalization. Antisemitism was centuries old
in Germany by the time Hitler was trying rebuild a nation with it. The idea of the
Volksgemeinschaft formed in the late sixteenth century and with it came the
concept of “blood and soil” (Sturm und Drang),101 where each “race” of people
had evolved their own culture in their own land. The Germans were an
Aryan/Nordic people, the French were Latin, and the Jews were Jewish. These
were lines that could never be crossed as they were how populations had naturally
evolved. Therefore, a Jew could never be a German, and vice versa. Nor were the
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Jews native to the land they lived on; Jewish culture had developed in the Levant,
not Central Europe. The European Jewish population not being an organic part of
the places they resided was key to how the Nazi’s weaponized antisemitism.102
Jews were not of German blood nor of German soil, thus their presence was cause
for alarm. Gemeinschaft also has connotations of being a genuine or authentic
community, meaning that Jews or other outsiders could not just assimilate to
German culture and be accepted.103 If the German nation and people were to be as
strong as possible, they needed to be rid of foreign elements that drained resources
and weakened the national community.
Germany’s Jews were outsiders to German culture, and it was this view of
them that the Nazis capitalized on. Antisemitism it was nearly ubiquitous in Volk
philosophy and pervaded German nationalism. As was common in Volk
nationalism, the Nazis said that any outside influence was hostile to Germany.
Nazi caricatures of Jews drew on stereotypes and prejudices that had existed since
the nineteenth century,104 meaning there was a readily available audience of
people who either believed already, or were predisposed to believe, negative
things about Jewish people. The aftermath of World War I left many searching for
someone or something to pin blame on, especially because of the credence given
to the stab-in-the-back legend. The Jews were easy scapegoats because they were
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“others”, a non-German people taking up space on German land and using
German resources.
The desire to rid Germany of enemies came to a head in November of 1923
when Hitler attempted a coup in Munich to take over the southern state of Bavaria.
Between 1918 and 1922, Bavaria had become a breeding ground of conservativenationalist resistance because it was the only state that had not outlawed a number
of radical right fringe groups deemed threats by the federal government.105 On the
night of November 8, in a beer hall that frequently hosted Nazi meetings, Hitler
attempted to coerce right-wing Bavarian leaders into supporting his plan to
takeover Berlin. Hitler declared that Bavaria had a new government headed by
him, with his cabinet including current officials. Upon leaving the beer hall the
morning of November 9, Hitler and his men were detained by police. Hitler was
tried for treason and sentenced to five years in prison, but he would only serve
nine months.
The Beer Hall Putsch, as it became known, shows how irreparable the
divide between the nationalists-conservatives and the political left had become.
Among Hitler’s entourage in Munich the night of November 8 was General Erich
Ludendorff. After the war Ludendorff embraced the violent nationalism of the
radical right. His involvement was significant because, as war hero and former
military leader, it aligned the goals and ideals of the Nazi Party with those of the
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German Empire, which the nationalists romanticized as the epitome German
strength. One such ideal was that the survival of the German nation and people
could only be ensured by the destruction of the forces that would do it harm. Just
one year prior to the Putsch, Ludendorff said that the German people should begin
preparing themselves for war with the Allies once again because it the only way
Germany’s suffering could be alleviated. For Ludendorff and other Volk
nationalists, war
is the foundation for comprehending anything political, the foundation of
our future, even and especially for the enslaved Nation of the Germans. Its
premise is that [Germany] wants to win back its autonomy, its freedom, its
welfare, and its developmental possibilities; and it resists our enemies’
intention to have us resign ourselves in perpetuity to degradation, to let
ourselves be stricken from the stage of world history.106
For Hitler, Ludendorff, and those who followed them, the Weimar system could
not be saved. The only solution to the economic, social, and political crises
Germany experienced was the complete annihilation of Weimar, the people who
brought it on and perpetuated it, and everything it represented.
The Putsch was also in part a response to two critical events of 1923: the
French occupation of the Ruhr industrial region near the French-German border
and the hyperinflation crisis. Both were labelled as consequences of fulfilling the
terms of the Treaty. Germany was in the midst of economic collapse when Hitler
was holding Bavarian officials hostage in a beer hall. From the Republic’s very
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beginning Germany struggled to keep up with reparations payments. The
reparations clauses of the Treaty of Versailles were drafted with Germany’s ruined
economy in mind yet made not concessions. Article 232 recognized that
Germany’s ability to pay was insufficient at the time of drafting but made full
compensation a requirement regardless.107 This is where the idea of debt slavery
emerged. Given the state of Germany’s economy in 1918 and immediately after it
was clear that Germany would be making payments decades into the future. On
January 9, 1923, French forces occupied the Ruhr region on the pretext that
Germany was behind on reparations payments.108 Starting in the summer of that
year, inflation started to escalate dramatically. Inflation was not new to the people
of Weimar Germany, as prices had risen significantly between 1919 and 1921
following demobilization.109 But the rate of inflation accelerated in 1922 because
the government was funding itself by printing new money.110 This continued
through 1923 and by the end of November the German Reichmark was valued at
one four-trillionth the US dollar, resulting in the wholesale collapse of German
currency.
Hitler justified the Putsch by saying it was done to save the German nation
from destruction. The events of 1923 certainly made the German people feel as
though the country were about to crumble. He directly mentions French
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occupation of the Ruhr as one of his reasons, as well as the desire to free the
German people from “slavery.”111 At his trial in 1924 he said, “Either Marxism
poisons the people, their Germany is ruined or the poison is going to be eliminated
– Then Germany can recover again, not before that.”112 Compromise was not an
option. Germany could only return to its place in the sun through war: “World
politics are not made with the palm branch, but with the sword.”113 German
suffering could only end if National Socialism took over, because they alone
recognized the true source of that suffering and were the only force willing to act.
The Beer Hall Putsch, Hitler’s trial, and his short imprisonment forced the
Nazi Party to rethink its political tactics for achieving its goals. Another failed
takeover could spell the end of the movement. 1928 marked the first time the
NSDAP participated in national parliamentary elections. Though participating in
the hated democratic system was contrary to all Nazi beliefs, Goebbels makes it
clear that this step did not mean the Party was compromising its values. It was
only to ensure that the National Socialist will was heard. In an article published in
April of 1928 in the Nazi newspaper Der Angriff (The Assault) Goebbels wrote,
“We will step foot on the marble floor of parliament with hard strides, and will
bring with us the revolutionary will of the multitude from which destiny has
spawned us. We don’t give a damn about cooperating with a stinking dung heap.
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We are coming to clear the manure.”114 The new tactic for taking over the country
was to infiltrate the government and dismantle it from the inside.
Blaming the Treaty of Versailles and the November Criminals continued to
be a critical point of Nazi propaganda during the Depression. Tensions were high
as unemployment and food scarcity skyrocketed starting in 1930. After the
hyperinflation of 1923 Germany had used short-term American loans to pay
reparations to France and Britain. When the American stock market crashed in
October of 1929 Germany was unable to pay back the money when the credits
were called in. After 1930, disagreements between parties about how best to
handle the economic crisis made a stable parliamentary majority coalition
unattainable, leaving Reichstag Chancellor Heinrich Brüning with no choice but to
use emergency powers to pass laws.115 How to handle the Depression was proving
beyond the capabilities of the Reichstag, and the situation only further deteriorated
as time went on. By the start of 1933 one in three people were unemployed.116 A
few weeks before the first of the 1932 elections, Joseph Goebbels gave a speech in
Berlin railing against those in power who ruined the country.117 In true Nazi
fashion he appealed to emotion to exploit the fear and desperation that pervaded
Germany during the Depression. He said, “the nation’s whole fortune is
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squandered, people are robbed of their inheritance, people are desperate and
without hope.”118 The choice of voting National Socialist or Social Democrat was
presented as being literally the difference between Germany’s life and death.
Goebbels makes several references to specific consequences of Versailles as well.
The territory given to Poland after the war so it could have sea access is referred to
as a “bleeding wound” that divided the country because it cut off the state of
Prussia in the east from the rest of Germany.119 The Dawes Plan of 1924 and the
Young Plan of 1930, both readjustments to Germany’s reparations plan in the
aftermath of economic crisis, brought only “more hunger, more torture, more
terror, more horror, and more suffering” to Germany.120 Using the same messages
and themes of social breakdown between 1929 and 1932 as between 1919 and
1923 allowed the Nazis to say that not only had Germany’s situation not improved
after fourteen years of Social Democratic control, it had gotten infinitely worse.
Germany’s experiment in democracy ended in March 1933 when Hitler was
appointed Reichstag Chancellor after the National Socialists secured a majority of
the vote in the 1932 election.
The Treaty of Versailles did not create the Third Reich, but it was
instrumental in the Nazi rise to power. The Treaty was important to the Nazi Party
because through it they were able to convince millions that Germany faced an

Goebbels, “The Storm is Coming,” 34.
Goebbels, “The Storm is Coming,” 34.
120
Goebbels, “The Storm is Coming,” 34.
118
119

46

existential threat and the choice between National Socialist and any other political
creed was a matter of life or death. By doing this National Socialism portrayed
itself as the only force that recognized these threats and the only one willing and
capable to eliminate them. Depictions of Versailles remained much the same
between 1919-1933; it was the cause of all German suffering. The Treaty was so
hated in Germany that it being blamed for any and every crisis was believable,
even if said crises was not caused by, or could not be explicitly tied to, fulfillment
of treaty conditions. The overarching message the Nazi Party pushed during the
Weimar era that was so successful was that accepting defeat and following the
Allies terms guaranteed Germany’s eventual annihilation. The very existence of
the German people was at stake because of the Treaty of Versailles, and that
necessitated radical and decisive action.
The rhetoric of Weimar-era Nazi propaganda regarding the Treaty of
Versailles underscores the existential fear that pervaded Germany after 1918. At
the beginning of the First World War the country seemed to be united as it never
had been before. The sudden announcement that Germany would surrender to the
Allies left millions of Germans in shock, wondering how such a thing could have
happened. Veterans were especially susceptible to Nazi rhetoric of sabotage and
betrayal because they were reminded that they had failed to protect their country.
The fundamental shift in German politics – from monarchy to democracy – came
so suddenly there was no way to prepare for it. Germany continuing the war as
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long as it had decimated the economy and with the added burden of reparations
payments guaranteed recovery would be slow and laborious and that the German
people would be feeling the negative effects long into the future.
This profound sense of fear and confusion manifested as anger and
hopelessness. The weak, fractured society of Germany after 1918 was a complete
reversal from the military world power it had been in 1914. Everyone wanted
answers, to have any way to rationalize what had happened. Losing World War I
and being subjected to the Treaty of Versailles challenged deeply entrenched
cultural ideals rooted in the Volk and shook the foundations of German cultural
identity. Millions of Germans were forced to reassess their place in the world on
both a national and individual scale.
Hitler and the Nazi Party exploited and harnessed the anger and uncertainty
over Germany’s future after the end of the war. The Party also created channels
for these frustrations to be released through by identifying certain people or groups
of people as being the reason why Germany failed. The Socialist government was
of course targeted because of its role in peace negotiations in 1918 and 1919 and
because of its inability to fix the crises that struck Germany afterward. The Jews
were also targeted because their status as outsider to German culture made them a
threat according to Volk philosophy. The November Criminals compromised a
mix of Socialist, Communist, leftist, and Jewish elements that in some way or
another supposedly had a hand in Germany’s downfall. The conspiracy theories
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the Nazi Party had about their opponents and their hand in making the Treaty of
Versailles created for Nazi supporters tangible goals and a sense of purpose in a
period defined by uncertainty and insecurity.
Studying the character of anti-Versailles Nazi Party propaganda raises
interesting questions about German identity and the quality of German nationalism
in the early twentieth century. The calamitous events of 1918-1933 upset
previously held notions of what it meant to be German and prompted, if not
necessitated, their redefinition. This attack on German national identity combined
with the existential fear that defined the Weimar era created a deadly brand of
reactionary nationalism, headed by the National Socialists, that sought to purge
every element that had upset those convictions and threatened the spirit of the
German Volk. Violence and mass murder against any and all foreign entities
became the only tools effective enough to restore the German nation to glory and
to save the German people from sure destruction.

49

Bibliography
Primary Sources:
“The Beer Hall Putsch and Hitler’s Trial.” In Inside Hitler’s Germany. Edited by
Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: DC Heath and Company,
1992, 75-78.
Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ulrich. “Speech of the German Delegation, Versailles, May
7, 1919.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook. Edited by Anton Kaes,
Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendburg. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1994, 9-12.
“The Constitution of the German Republic,” in The Weimar Republic Sourcebook.
Edited by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendburg. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, 48-51.
“The Defeated Troops Come Home,” in Inside Hitler’s Germany. Edited by
Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: DC Heath and Company,
1992, 28-31.
Drexler, Anton. “Guidelines of the DAP (1919)”. Alpha History.
https://alphahistory.com/nazigermany/guidelines-of-the-dap-1919/.
Goebbels, Joseph. “National Socialism or Bolshevism?” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook. Edited by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendburg.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, 127-129.
----------------. “The Nazis in Parliament.” In Inside Hitler’s Germany. Edited by
Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: DC Heath and Company,
1992, 87-89.
----------------. “The Storm is Coming.” In Randall L. Bytwerk, Landmark
Speeches of National Socialism. College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 2008, 32-39.
----------------. “We Demand.” German Propaganda Archive. Calvin University.
https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/angrif05.htm.
----------------. “Why Do We Oppose the Jews? (1928).” German Propaganda
Archive. Calvin University. https://research.calvin.edu/german-propagandaarchive/angrif17.htm.
Hindenburg, Paul von. “The Stab in the Back.” In The Weimar Republic
Sourcebook. Edited by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendburg.
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, 15-16.

50

Hitler, Adolf. “An Early Speech by Hitler” in Inside Hitler’s Germany. Edited by
Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: D.C. Heath and Company,
1992, 68-69.
-------------. “Hitler on the Jews (1922).” Alpha History.
https://alphahistory.com/nazigermany/hitler-on-the-jews-1922/.
-------------. Mein Kampf. Translated by James Murphy. Project Gutenberg
Australia. http://gutenberg.net.au/ebooks02/0200601.txt.
-------------. “Reestablishing the National Socialist German Workers Party.” In
Randall Bytwerk, Landmark Speeches of National Socialism. College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2008, 14-31.
Ludendorff, Erich. “On Overcoming the Consequences of the Lost War (1922).”
http://www.csun.edu/~hfspc002/442/txt/luden.html.
“The National Assembly Debate on the Treaty of Versailles.” In Inside Hitler’s
Germany. Edited by Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: DC Heath
and Company, 1992, 45-47.
“A New Constitution and a New Form of Government,” in Inside Hitler’s
Germany. Edited by Benjamin Sax and Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: DC Heath
and Company, 1992, 41-45.
“The Party Program.” In Inside Hitler’s Germany. Edited by Benjamin Sax and
Dieter Kuntz. Lexington: DC Heath and Company, 1992, 72-75.
“The Story of a Bank Clerk.” In Theodore Abel, Why Hitler Came Into Power.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938, 274-289.
“The Story of Soldier.” In Theodore Abel, Why Hitler Came Into Power.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1938, 244-262.
“The Treaty of Versailles, 28 June 1919.” In The Nazi Germany Sourcebook.
Edited by Roderick Stackelburg and Sally A. Winkle. New York:
Routledge, 2002, 54-58.
Troeltsch, Ernst. “The Dogma of Guilt.” In The Weimar Republic Sourcebook.
Edited by Anton Kaes, Martin Jay, and Edward Dimendburg. Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994, 12-15.
The World War I Document Archive. “The Ultimatum by the Social Democrats.”
https://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Ultimatum_by_the_Social_Democrats.
United States Department of State. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 1918, Supplement 1, The World War, Volume 1.
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1918Supp01v01/d327.

51

Secondary Sources:
Abel, Theodore. Why Hitler Came Into Power. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1938.
Allen, William Sheridan. The Nazi Seizure of Power: The Experience of a Single
German Town, 1922-1945. Revised Edition. New York: Franklin Watts,
1984.
Bessel, Richard. Germany After the First World War. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1993.
Butler, Rohan D’Olier. The Roots of National Socialism, 1783-1933. New York:
Howard Fertig, 1968.
Bytwerk, Randall L. “The Magical Force of the Spoken Word.” In Landmark
Speeches of National Socialism. College Station: Texas A&M University
Press, 2008, 1-13.
Eley, Geoff. From Unification to Nazism: Reinterpreting the German Past.
Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1986.
Epstein, Catherine. Nazi Germany: Confronting the Myths. Chicester: John Wiley
& Sons, Ltd., 2015.
Flenley, Ralph. Modern German History. New York: E.P. Dutton & Co. Inc.,
1953.
Herzstein, Robert E. Adolf Hitler and the German Trauma. New York: G.P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1974.
Hoover, Calvin. Germany Enters the Third Reich. London: MacMillan and Co.
Limited, 1933.
Kolb, Eberhard. The Weimar Republic. Translated by P.S. Falla. London: Unwin
Hyman, 1988.
Kühne, Thomas. Belonging and Genocide: Hitler’s Community, 1918-1945. New
York: Yale University Press, 2010.
Marx, Fritz Morstein. Government in the Third Reich. New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company Inc., 1936.
McGowan, Lee. The Radical Right in Germany: 1870 to Present. New York and
London: Routledge, 2003.
Mosse, George L. Germans and Jews: The Right, The Left, and The Search For a
“Third Force” in Pre-Nazi Germany. New York: Howard Fertig, 1970.

52

Peukert, Detlev. The Weimar Republic. Translated by Richard Deveson. New
York: Hill and Wang, 1993.

